Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

9-2016

Preambles as Guidance
Kevin M. Stack

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\84-5\GWN503.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

8-SEP-16

16:03

Preambles as Guidance
Kevin M. Stack*
ABSTRACT
Debates over administrative agencies’ reliance on guidance documents
have largely neglected the most authoritative source of guidance about the
meaning of agency regulations: their preambles. This Article examines and
defends the guidance function of preambles. Preambles were designed not
only to provide the agency’s official justification for the regulations they introduce, but also to offer guidance about the regulation’s meaning and application. Today, preambles include extensive guidance ranging from interpretive
commentary to application examples. Based on the place of preamble guidance as part of the agency’s formal explanation of the regulation and the
rigorous internal agency vetting which accompanies that formal role, this Article argues that preamble guidance has greater authority than other forms of
guidance. That greater authority has important implications. Under current
judicial doctrine, preamble guidance warrants greater deference than other
forms of guidance. Preamble guidance’s superiority also grounds the agency’s
obligation to act consistently with it—and to revise preamble guidance only in
documents issued by the agency, as opposed to lower-level officials, with the
same publicity as the original preamble. This obligation should be expressly
adopted as a form of internal administrative law either by individual agencies
or central executive branch regulators.
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INTRODUCTION
More than a decade of lively debate has focused on how administrative agencies use guidance documents—interpretive rules and general statements of policy exempt from the requirements of notice-andcomment under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).1 Many
credit guidance documents as playing a critical role in regulatory programs.2 Even though they lack the force of law,3 guidance documents
can promote consistency and uniformity in agency action.4 Guidance
documents that convey an agency’s view of the law or its enforcement
1 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012) (exempting
“interpretative rules” and “general statements of policy” from notice-and-comment rulemaking);
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203–04 (2015) (noting this exception). The term
“guidance documents” refers to those documents exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking.
See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398–400 (2007) (providing concise account of “guidance documents” and
noting that some commentators refer to these as “nonlegislative rules”); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 334
(2011). A more technical definition of guidance documents is “an agency statement of general
applicability . . . that is not intended to have the force and effect of law but that sets forth a
policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or regulatory issue.” Regulatory Accountability Act of 2013, S. 1029, 113th Cong. § 2(3) (2013). The
Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) definition of “guidance documents” makes only
one change to the definition in the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2013: “an agency statement
of general applicability and future effect, other than a regulatory action . . . that sets forth a
policy on a statutory, regulatory or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or regulatory issue.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. NO.
07-02, FINAL BULLETIN FOR AGENCY GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES 19 (2007) [hereinafter
OMB’s Good Guidance Bulletin], https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Paul R. Noe & John D. Graham, Due Process and Management for Guidance
Documents: Good Governance Long Overdue, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 103, 108 (2008) (noting that
guidance documents are “key component[s] of regulatory programs”).
3 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204 (noting that nonlegislative rules lack the force of law).
4 See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 341 (noting how guidance can enhance consistency). See
generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age,
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priorities can also promote values of fair notice; the public and regulated entities generally prefer knowing an agency’s positions prior to
facing them in an enforcement proceeding.5
While acknowledging that guidance documents serve useful functions, policymakers and commentators have sought greater transparency and participation rights in the development of agency
guidance.6 More pointedly, critics contend that agencies rely on guidance documents in ways that circumvent the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process.7 Their concern is that agencies are turning increasingly to guidance to establish norms that have significant de facto
weight without the participation and accountability virtues of a noticeand-comment process.8 Far from remaining solely a matter of insider
119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1466–67 (2010) (noting the connections between internally generated law
and consistency).
5 See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 341 (noting that because guidance applies prospectively,
regulated entities gain information about the agency’s plans and understandings as opposed to
having to guess); Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring
Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001) (noting that citizens
are better off if they know how agencies understand and intend to apply the law); cf. Jacob E.
Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573,
579, 601 (2008) (noting that soft law provides information that helps the public adjust its
behavior).

R

6 See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 1, at 438–44 (arguing for an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to allow stakeholders to petition agencies to amend or repeal
guidance).

R

7 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 660–69 (1996).
8 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“One
guidance document may yield another and then another . . . . Law is made, without notice and
comment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal Register or the
Code of Federal Regulations.”); H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 9 (2000) (“[A]gencies have sometimes improperly used guidance documents as a backdoor way to bypass the statutory noticeand-comment requirements for agency rulemaking . . . .”); 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2 (1993) (“The
Conference is concerned . . . about situations where agencies issue policy statements which they
treat or which are reasonably regarded by the public as binding . . . . [But these pronouncements
do] not offer the opportunity for public comment . . . .”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14,
Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (No. 13-1041), 2014 WL 6749784, at *13–14 (“[B]ut part of what’s motivating it is a sense that agencies more and more are using interpretive rules and are using guidance
documents to make law and that there is—it’s essentially an end run around the notice and
comment provisions.” (question of Justice Kagan)); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of
Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83
GEO. L.J. 2407, 2437 (1995) (arguing that the EPA relies on guidance to avoid oversight by
courts, Congress, and the OMB); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal
Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 166–67 (2000) (arguing that agencies avoid ossified rulemaking processes by use of nonbinding guidance). As noted below, recent empirical research calls into question the theory of strategic substitution by agencies of
guidance documents for rules. See infra Section I.C.
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debate, these issues have sparked congressional hearings and bills,9 as
well as executive orders from Presidents George W. Bush and Barack
Obama.10 The Supreme Court, too, has expressed concerns about guidance documents. In 2001, for instance, the Court decided that notice-and-comment rules, but not guidance documents, presumptively
qualify for greater judicial deference.11
This extended debate over agency guidance and its relationship to
notice-and-comment rulemaking has largely overlooked what is often
the most important form of guidance about the meaning and application of regulations—namely, the guidance content appearing in the
preambles to final rules. The preamble is a well-established feature of
the regulatory process.12 In notice-and-comment rulemaking, the
APA requires agencies to publish a “concise general statement of
their basis and purpose” when it issues a final rule.13 That statement,
along with some other material, constitutes what is known as the preamble to final rules or the regulatory preamble.14 These extensive explanatory documents typically run many more pages than the text of
the rules themselves.
9 See generally Regulatory Accountability Act of 2013, S. 1029, 113th Cong. (2013) (providing a definition of guidance as “other than a rule”); Non-Codified Documents Is the Department of Labor Regulating the Public Through the Backdoor?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Nat’l Econ. Growth, Nat. Res. & Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th
Cong. (2000) (examining agency guidance with regard to the Department of Labor); H.R. REP.
NO. 106-1009 (examining agency guidance practices).
10 In 2007, President Bush issued an executive order, which subjected significant guidance
documents to centralized review by the OMB. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191, 193
(2008). The OMB subsequently issued general guidelines governing agency guidance practices.
See OMB’s Good Guidance Bulletin, supra note 1, at 20. In 2010, President Obama revoked
President Bush’s executive order. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218, 218 (2010), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 816 (2012). However, the OMB continues to review
significant guidance documents, and the OMB’s guidelines on good guidance practices remain in
effect. See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads and
Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Orszag Memorandum],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf.
11 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (providing that noticeand-comment rules presumptively qualify for Chevron deference so long as they are issued pursuant to a statutory authorization to bind with the force of law).
12 The preamble to federal rules typically appears under the Supplemental Information
heading in the Federal Register. See NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., FEDERAL REGISTER
DOCUMENT DRAFTING HANDBOOK 12 (1991) (directing that extended discussion of the rule belongs in the Supplementary Information section).
13

5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).

See 1 C.F.R. § 18.12 (2012) (setting forth requirements for “preambles” to final rules).
This Article’s references to preambles and regulatory preambles are to those statements for final
rules, and not the preambles to notices of proposed rulemaking.
14
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Regulatory preambles have an undeniable importance to law and
governance in the United States. We live in an era of regulation in
which the number and length of administrative rules issued through
notice-and-comment rulemaking far exceed comparable measures for
statutes produced by Congress.15 Under established administrative
law, the validity of these agency rules is largely determined by evaluation of the rules’ preambles.16 As a result, regulatory preambles convey the legal justification for large swaths of federal law in the United
States. But they do more than that. These statements were conceived
as serving—and continue to serve—a guidance function, providing advice about the meaning, application, and implementation of the
agency’s regulations. Although they are a ubiquitous, authoritative,
and important source of guidance, preambles have been largely unmentioned in the debates over agency reliance on guidance.17
This Article provides an assessment of preambles as guidance and
situates this form of guidance within principles of administrative law.
Because the guidance function of preambles has fallen so far from
view, Part I of the Article is devoted to establishing that preambles
have a guidance function. Not only did the APA conceive of the regulation’s statement of “basis and purpose” as serving a guidance role,
15 See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 13–21 (4th ed. 2011) (documenting, in terms of the
number of rules and pages in the Federal Register devoted to federal regulations, a level of
production of regulations beginning in the 1970s that far exceeds comparable measures for statutes). Compare MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS:
AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE Federal
Register 5 (2013) (reporting the number of final rules published annually from 1997 to 2012
ranged from “a low of 2,482 regulations in 2012 to a high of 4,388 regulations in 1998”), with
Legislation of the U.S. Congress: All Legislation Since 1973, CONGRESS.GOV (reporting 3992 total
statutes enacted by Congress from 1997–2016) https://www.congress.gov/legislation?q=%7B%22
congress%22%3A%5B%22112%22%2C%22110%22%2C%22111%22%2C%22109%22%2C
%22108%22%2C%22107%22%2C%22106%22%2C%22105%22%2C%22113%22%2C%2211
4%22%5D%2C%22bill-status%22%3A%22law%22%7D [https://perma.cc/GD96-MZDT] (last
visited July 10, 2016).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 39–45.
17 A few scholars have observed that agencies include statements of basis and purpose to
explain their rules and their implementation, and questioned aspects of this practice. See, e.g.,
JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 337 (5th ed. 2012) (“Agencies often use the statement [of basis and purpose] to advise interested persons how the rule will
be applied, to respond to questions raised by comments received during the rulemaking, and as a
‘legislative history’ that can be referred to in future applications of the rule.”); Lazarus, supra
note 8, at 2437 (noting that the EPA creates “underground environmental law” in the form of
extensive guidance documents and lengthy, detailed preambles). See generally Catherine M.
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 227–29 (2007) (revealing and criticizing agencies’ inclusion of preemption
statements in preambles to their rules).

R
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but it did so on sound principles. Under well-established principles of
administrative law, the preamble is the public justification for the
rules in judicial review; as a result, that justification has an authoritative status for guiding the courts and the public about the rule’s application.18 What is more, as a brief survey of agency rulemaking reveals,
agencies provide a tremendous amount of guidance in their preambles—and guidance of widely varying types, from specific application
examples to interpretive comments on the interaction of their rules
with the common law.19 Indeed, guidance is such a pervasive feature
of regulatory preambles that its neglect in debates over guidance documents is curious. The increased focus on the justificatory and analysis role of the preamble appears to have distracted from evaluation of
its guidance function.20
In Part II, the Article argues that the guidance agencies provide
in preambles (or preamble guidance) has greater authority than other
forms of agency guidance. Unlike most other guidance, preambles are
issued contemporaneously with agencies’ rules, and by the same authority that issues the rule—the agency itself, not individual officers or
subordinate entities within the agency.21 Because the preambles are
the primary source of justification for agency rules, they are subject to
higher levels of internal vetting, deliberation, and approval within the
agency than the vast majority of guidance documents.22 Moreover,
preambles for rules issued by executive agencies are subject to the
accountability checks of centralized executive review by the White
House, as exercised through the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”) by its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”).23 They are also published as part of the rulemaking package in the most accessible, searchable, and highly visible forum for
agency documents, the Federal Register—where only a subset of
agency guidance documents is published. Along these dimensions individually and collectively, preambles—and the guidance in them—
See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
See infra Section I.B.
20 For a general treatment of the legal regime that applies to preambles, see KEVIN M.
STACK, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS: EVALUATING PREAMBLES, REGULATORY TEXT, AND FREESTANDING DOCUMENTS AS VEHICLES FOR
REGULATORY GUIDANCE 13–30 (2014) [hereinafter STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING
PROCESS] (arguing that integrating preamble guidance into other guidance may help overcome
perceptions that preambles pertain only to legal sufficiency).
21 See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
23 Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81, 111–12 (2015) (providing account of Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) vetting process).
18
19

R
R
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have a greater claim to represent the authoritative interpretation of
the agency than other forms of guidance.
In Part III, the Article addresses implications of the superiority of
preambles for judicial review. It argues that preambles warrant
greater weight in judicial review than other forms of guidance documents. The once arcane topic of the standard of judicial review for
agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations is today one of the
most hotly contested and watched issues in administrative law. The
Supreme Court is currently debating whether to further limit or abandon the long-established doctrine of Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co.24 and Auer v. Robbins,25 which requires reviewing courts to accept
the agency’s interpretation of their own regulations unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.26 Regardless of how the
Court resolves that issue, the Article identifies an underlying principle
in the Court’s current deference doctrines: the agency’s own most considered and deliberate interpretations warrant greatest deference.
Under that principle, preamble guidance presents a special case for
deference for the very reasons that make it more authoritative than
other forms of guidance. Accordingly, for agencies, preambles provide a critical opportunity to obtain deference for their guidance content, an opportunity that will be all the more valuable if the Supreme
Court abandons Seminole Rock/Auer deference.
The superiority of preamble guidance also imposes constraints on
the agency, as addressed in Part IV. First, preamble guidance presumptively supersedes previously-issued guidance documents. Second, the superiority of preamble guidance imposes constraints on the
agency’s power to revise it. While an agency is not prohibited procedurally from revising its guidance so long as it has a good justification,
the superiority of preamble guidance creates an obligation to revise it
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). While this doctrine was traditionally associated
with Seminole Rock, since 1997, the Supreme Court and other courts have frequently attributed
it to Auer. See, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Seminole Rock doctrine has recently been attributed to Auer).
Chief Justice Roberts, the late Justice Scalia, as well as Justices Thomas and Alito expressed an
interest in revisiting or overruling Seminole Rock/Auer. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135
S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (calling for the Court to overrule
Auer); id. at 1213, 1224 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing Auer should be overruled); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(joining with Justice Alito in noting that “[i]t may be appropriate to reconsider” Seminole Rock/
Auer in another case); id. at 1339, 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(urging the Court to overturn Seminole Rock/Auer).
26 See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461; Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 413–14.
24
25
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in a document of roughly equivalent formality—that is, in guidance
issued at the same level in the agency’s hierarchy and published at the
same level of visibility—namely, in the Federal Register. This obligation, though not judicially enforceable under the APA,27 should be
adopted as part of executive branch internal administrative law, either
by individual agencies or by a centralized executive branch policy.
The Article thus has two overriding aims. At a practical level, it
seeks to draw attention to preamble guidance as a critical part of the
conversation about regulatory guidance, and to provide a framework
for how courts, as well as agencies and executive branch regulators,
treat this form of guidance. More generally, the Article’s effort to
identify a hierarchical structure within the vast domain of regulatory
soft law seeks to advance the larger goal of articulating a jurisprudence that fits the actual practices of lawmaking and administration of
the current state.28
I. THE GUIDANCE FUNCTION

OF

PREAMBLES

This Part provides an overview of the guidance function of preambles—that is, as a source of advice about the meaning, application,
and implementation of the regulations they accompany. It first argues
that these explanatory documents were conceived as serving a guidance function—and on sound theoretical grounds. It then provides a
sampling of the ways in which agencies provide guidance in their preambles today. Finally, it offers an explanation of why this guidance
function has faded from view and evaluation.
A. The Dual Roles of Justification and Guidance
The APA provides a simple structure for notice-and-comment
rulemaking.29 Section 553 of the APA sets out three basic elements of
notice-and-comment rulemaking.30 First, § 553 requires publication of
See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1209–10.
It could be viewed as articulating a normative structure for production of guidance,
which has been referred to as being part of current unorthodox rulemaking. See Abbe R. Gluck
et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1803 (2015)
(identifying agency guidance as a form of unorthodox rulemaking).
27
28

29

See STACK, GUIDANCE

IN THE

RULEMAKING PROCESS, supra note 20, at 7–8.

Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012)). Section 553 provides a default process for rulemaking
except in the rare case that a statute requires rulemaking be conducted through the APA’s formal rulemaking procedure, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (noting that APA § 556 and § 557 apply when
the rules are required by statute “to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing”), or when an agency’s statute specifies its own rulemaking procedure.
30

R
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a “notice of proposed rulemaking” in the Federal Register,31 commonly referred to as an “NPRM.” Second, after publication of that
required notice, the agency “shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments.”32 Third, after consideration of these comments, “the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose.”33
Early understandings of the APA suggested that these statements
of “basis and purpose,” comprising much of what is commonly referred to as a regulation’s preamble, were intended to have a dual
role. They were conceived as not only identifying the legal and factual
basis for the rule, but also providing guidance on its meaning for the
public and the courts.34 This point comes through clearly in the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act.35 Of the
statement of basis and purpose, the Manual states, “[t]he required
statement will be important in that the courts and the public may be
expected to use such statements in the interpretation of the agency’s
rules.”36 The Manual further anticipates that, “the statement is intended to advise the public of the general basis and purpose of the
rules.”37 The APA’s legislative history also supports this understanding. “The required statement of the basis and purpose of rules is31 STACK GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, supra note 20, at 7–8 (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)).
32 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)).
33 Id. The APA exempts from these notice-and-consideration requirements, among other
exceptions, “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, [and] rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice,” which are often referred to as “guidance documents.” Id. (citing
§ 553(b)(3)(A)); see Mendelson, supra note 1, at 406 (describing process applicable to guidance
documents).
34 STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, supra note 20, at 8 (citing U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 32,
128 (1947)).
35 See id. As Lars Noah notes, this Manual has been treated as authoritative guidance on
the APA. See Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of
Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 309 n.201 (2000) (noting several examples); see also Bowen
v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to “the
Government’s own most authoritative interpretation of the APA . . . which we have repeatedly
given great weight”); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 546 (1978) (noting that it represents “a contemporaneous interpretation previously given
some deference by this Court because of the role played by the Department of Justice in drafting
the legislation”). Some have criticized the Manual because it was prepared post-enactment by
the Attorney General with some stake in the issues. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative
Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 131–34 (1998). That criticism, however,
has little bearing on the particular commentary on rulemaking relied upon here.
36 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 32.
37 Id.

R
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sued,” as both the House and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports
commented, “should not only relate to the data so presented but with
reasonable fullness explain the actual basis and objectives of the
rule.”38
This basic idea that a regulation’s statement of basis and purpose
is meant to apprise the public of the effect and application of the
rule—to serve a guidance function—makes intuitive sense. The
agency itself, not a lower-level official, issues the statement, and does
so as an explanation of the rule at the time the rule is issued. These
features, which make the statement part and parcel of the agency’s act
of rulemaking, also give the statement an inherent authority. Basic
principles of administrative law further augment the statement’s authority. Under the longstanding doctrine associated with SEC v. Chenery Corp.,39 a reviewing court will judge the validity of an agency rule
only upon the grounds that the agency offered to justify it.40 This doctrine, called the Chenery (or Chenery I) doctrine, means that the
agency’s statement of basis and purpose is authoritative in the sense
that courts will uphold an agency rule based on grounds relied upon
by the agency in the statement of basis and purpose.41 Evidence, arguments, or interpretive positions that do not appear in the statement
generally will not save the rule on review.42 Accordingly, when an
38 H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 25 (1946); S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 15 (1945). The Senate
Report also contains as an appendix the Attorney General’s 1945 report on Senate Bill 7. S.
REP. NO. 79-752, at 37–38. The Attorney General’s report stated the following in regards to the
statement of basis and purpose:
Section 4 (b), in requiring the publication of a concise general statement of the
basis and purpose of rules made without formal hearing, is not intended to require
an elaborate analysis of rules or of the detailed considerations upon which they are
based but is designed to enable the public to obtain a general idea of the purpose
of, and a statement of the basic justification for, the rules. The requirement would
also serve much the same function as the whereas clauses which are now customarily found in the preambles of Executive orders.
Id. at 39.
39 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
40 See id. at 87.
41 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2710 (2015) (using the agency’s statement of
basis and purpose to judge the rationales upon which the agency relied for the purposes of
review); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50
(1983) (invoking same principle); Richard Murphy, Chenery Unmasked: Reasonable Limits on
the Duty to Give Reasons, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 840 (2012) (noting that under Chenery, courts
began to require an agency’s statement of basis and purpose “to respond to all significant objections leveled at the rule during the comment process”).
42 Some courts allow an exception when the agency has “articulated and acted on a consistent rationale throughout the course of a lengthy informal [notice-and-comment] rulemaking
process, the final rule [will not be] arbitrary and capricious because the rationale was not fully
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agency regulation is reviewed under Chevron, it is the agency’s interpretations in the preamble that form the basis for determining
whether the agency’s interpretations are permissible.43 Likewise,
when a regulation is reviewed under arbitrary and capricious review,
the preamble serves as the agency’s explanation of the rationality and
factual basis of the rule’s validity.44 For these and other reasons, I
have argued in other writing that the agency’s account of the purposes
of the regulations and its provisions in the preamble should have a
privileged place when courts interpret regulations.45
A closely related point is critical here: constricting judicial review
of a rule’s validity to the rule’s statement of basis and purpose also
augments the statement’s guidance role. Though the Chenery rule was
originally justified on other grounds,46 a byproduct of the doctrine is
making the preamble an authoritative form of guidance. By virtue of
the rule in Chenery, the preamble becomes the agency’s chance to explain its rule to the courts. Closely related, Chenery tells the regulated
entities and the public that when an agency rule is reviewed, the
agency will be limited to the explanations and justifications for the
rule provided in the statement of basis and purpose.47 As a result, the
regulated entities and the public also have reason to treat those explanations and justifications as authoritative commentary on the rule.
Not only does the public have reason to treat the preamble as
authoritative, but the fact that the preamble includes the agency’s reasons for the rule gives the preamble an inherent guidance function.
This point follows from an observation Professor Frederick Schauer
makes about the practice of reason-giving. As explained by Professor
Schauer, publicly expressed reasons have a logical structure of “propositions of greater generality than the conclusions they are reasons
for.”48 As a result, when we give reasons for an action, that reasongiving creates “a prima facie commitment to other outcomes falling
reiterated” in the statement of basis and purpose. See Gatewood v. Outlaw, 560 F.3d 843, 848
(8th Cir. 2009).
43 See STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, supra note 20, at 27–30.
44 See id. at 10–13.
45 See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 391–96 (2012)
(arguing that regulations should be interpreted in light of purposes given to them in their statements of basis and purpose); cf. Halo v. Yale Health Plan, 819 F.3d 42, 52 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing
id. and explaining that regulatory interpretation involves interpretation of the regulation’s text in
light of its purposes, as stated in the regulation’s preamble, as well as the purpose of the regulation’s authorizing statute).
46 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87–89 (1943).
47 See id.
48 Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 638 (1995).
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within [the] scope” of the reason.49 To translate this general idea into
the agency rulemaking context, when the agency offers a justification
for its course of action and characterization of the objectives of the
rule in its preamble, it makes a prima facie commitment to those reasons.50 “[B]ecause reasons have greater generality than the outcomes
they support,” the reasons an agency gives in the preamble bear on
the application and interpretation of its rules.51 It is not that those
reasons can never be overcome, nor that agencies do not also provide
specific guidance in preambles. In Part IV, I address below how agencies can revise these commitments. The point here is only that the
justifications agencies provide in their preambles do, at a minimum,
create prima facie commitments to reading the rules in light of the
reasons given to justify them. Accordingly, the very role of the statement of basis and purpose as the agency’s public justification for the
rule gives these statements a guidance function. In this legal context,
guidance is an unavoidable part of justification—and, more specifically, an ineluctable feature of the regulation’s statement of “basis and
purpose.”
B. Sampling of Guidance in Preambles
Not only does the APA provide statements of basis and purpose a
guidance role, but agencies provide extensive guidance content in
their preambles. The guidance in preambles goes well beyond the
grounds necessary to justify a rule and frequently includes very specific interpretive positions and application advice. Agencies include
interpretive positions on general and specific legal questions as well as
detailed application examples. Interestingly, much of the guidance
provided in preambles could be issued in separate guidance documents. Agencies clearly make choices—implicitly, explicitly, or strategically—to include guidance content in their preambles or in
separately-issued guidance documents.
The guidance agencies provide in their preambles can be roughly
categorized into three types: (1) that pertaining to purposes or justifications of the rule, (2) interpretive commentary on the meaning of the
rule, and (3) application examples. Given the scope of federal
rulemaking—not to mention the diversion of readers’ attention when
Id. at 648.
See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 997
(2007) (quoting Schauer, supra note 48, at 638) (elaborating connection between reason-giving
and requirement that agency action be upheld only upon grounds stated by the agency).
51 See id.
49
50
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confronted with examples from the Federal Register—the aim here is
simply to provide a few illustrations of these types of guidance.
1. Purpose Statements
The most straightforward job of a preamble is to provide an explanation of the purpose of its regulation and its provisions in relation
to the authorizing statute,52 and for reasons just discussed, that justificatory material includes guidance. For a garden-variety example, consider the Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) 2011 rule
restricting use of hand-held mobile phones by drivers of commercial
motor vehicles (“CMVs”).53 The DOT has statutory authority to
“prescribe regulations on commercial motor vehicle safety . . . [including those setting] minimum safety standards for commercial motor vehicles.”54 Under this authority, the DOT studied driver distractions
and concluded that the odds of being in a safety-critical event were six
times higher when the driver was hand-dialing a cell phone.55 “Because of the data on distractions associated with the use of hand-held
mobile telephones while driving,” the DOT took the position, in the
preamble to the 2011 rule, that “it is in the best interest of public
safety to restrict a CMV driver’s use of such devices.”56 The DOT
reasoned that CMV drivers should be limited to voice dialing, where
the driver can initiate or receive a call by touching a single button, and
“does not require the driver to take his or her eyes off the forward
roadway for an extended period—comparable to using vehicle controls or instrument panel functions.”57 The DOT’s rule restricted a
driver from “dialing a mobile telephone by pressing more than a single button.”58 The standard set forth in the preamble—that the
driver’s attention should not be diverted more than by using standard
vehicle controls—sheds light on the rule’s application to other features of smartphones.
52

1 C.F.R. § 18.12 (2012) (setting forth requirements for “preambles” to final rules).

Drivers of CMVs: Restricting the Use of Cellular Phones, 76 Fed. Reg. 75,470 (Dec. 2,
2011) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 383, 384, 390, 391 & 392).
53

54

Id. at 75,472; see also 49 U.S.C. § 31136 (2012).

55

Drivers of CMVs: Restricting the Use of Cellular Phones, 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,472.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 75,475.

Id. at 75,481. “This exception allows CMV drivers to use their hand-held mobile telephones if necessary to communicate with law enforcement officials or other emergency services.” Id.
58
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2. Interpretive Commentary
In preambles, agencies frequently provide express interpretive
commentary on the meaning of their rules and also explain the rule’s
relationship to other rules and statutes. That interpretive commentary
often appears in that agency’s designated “section-by-section” analysis
of the rule as well as in its explicit responses to commentators. Consider the following examples:
a. In a regulation amending the Consumer Protection Financial
Bureau’s (“CFPB”) Regulation E, which implements the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”),59 the CFPB provided a section-by-section analysis that is subdivided numerically and by topic with subsections tracking sections in the rule (such as “Section 1005.2
Definitions” and “Section 1005.3 Coverage”).60 This commentary included conclusions about the scope of the rule’s application.61 For instance, the agency offered an interpretation of the term “agent” in the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act:
EFTA section 919 does not use consistent terminology concerning agents of remittance transfer providers . . . . The Bureau does not believe that these statutory wording
differences are intended to establish different standards
across the rule. Therefore, the rule generally refers to
“agents,” as defined in § 1005.30(a), to provide consistency
across the rule.62
The CFPB also advised that because “the concept of agency has
historically been defined by common law, it is appropriate for the definition to defer to applicable law regarding agents, including with respect to what creates or constitutes an agency relationship.”63
b. In a Department of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”) rule implementing the DVA’s medical foster home program, the preamble reported that a commenter had asked whether the spouse of a married
veteran could move into the medical foster home with the veteran or
if the rule forced couples to live apart.64 The DVA answered that
59 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 6194 (Feb. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005); see also Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control
Act of 1978 (Electronic Fund Transfers Act), Pub. L. No. 90-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
60 Electronic Fund Transfers, supra note 59, at 6204–05.
61 Id. at 6204–71.
62 Id. at 6205.
63 Id.
64 Medical Foster Homes, 77 Fed. Reg. 5186, 5187 (Feb. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 38
C.F.R. pt. 17).
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“[n]othing in the regulation would preclude the spouse of a veteran
from living in the same medical foster home as the veteran. Such an
arrangement would be a matter of agreement between the spouse of
the veteran and the medical foster home caregiver.”65
c. In a Department of Treasury and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) rule defining “members of a family” for purposes
of filing a customs family declaration, the agency included a “Definition of Resident” section.66 There, the agency addressed a commenter’s question about whether the definition of “resident” as used
by the CBP in this context was the same as “permanent resident” as
used in the immigration-law context.67 The agency’s response provides very clear guidance on the meaning of “resident”:
The term “resident” for purposes of this regulation is not the
same as “lawful permanent resident” in immigration law.
For customs purposes, pursuant to 19 CFR 148.2, persons arriving from foreign countries are divided into two categories:
(1) Residents of the United States returning from abroad
and (2) all other persons (i.e., visitors).68
d. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
provided extensive interpretive guidance in response to comments
within a section-by-section analysis in a rule implementing Title II of
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act.69 The preamble addressed a commenter’s suggestion that medical information obtained
from one employee should not be considered family medical history
of a family member who also works for the same employer.70 The
EEOC rejected this suggestion, writing, “[w]e do not think Congress
could have intended that an employee not be protected from the discriminatory use or the disclosure of his or her genetic information just
because the employer obtained it from a family member who was also
an employee.”71
Id.
Members of a Family for Purpose of Filing CBP Family Declaration, 78 Fed. Reg.
76,529, 76,530–31 (Dec. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 148).
67 Id. at 76,530.
68 Id.
69 See Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed.
Reg. 68,912, 68,913–31 (Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter GINA Regs.] (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1635); see also Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110233, tit. II, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–2000ff-11 (2012)).
70 GINA Regs., supra note 69, at 68,915.
71 Id. at 68,916. The Small Business Administration (“SBA”) and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) also take interpretive positions in their preambles. See, e.g., Small Business Investment Companies—Early Stage SBICs, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,042, 25,044–49 (Apr. 27, 2012)
65
66
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e. The Railroad Retirement Board (“RRB”) used a questionand-answer format conveying clear guidance in the preamble of a rule
regarding evaluation of disabilities.72 The preamble is divided into
sections including, “What Programs Will the Final Rule Affect?” and
“How Is Disability Defined?”73 In the section, “How Does This Final
Rule Address That Problem?,” the RRB responds to commenters by
stating:
The Board has reviewed the comments and the amendments
to section 220.178(c)(1) and agrees that the second sentence
could be confusing. We have modified that sentence to make
it clear that in a continuing disability review, the claimant’s
current severity will be compared to the standard that was
used to make the original, or “comparison point”, decision.74
These examples suggest the many ways in which agencies take
interpretive positions in their preambles—positions that frequently
could appear in separately-issued documents.
3. Detailed Application Examples
Agencies also provide guidance in preambles through the use of
detailed examples. The Department of Education (“DOE”) examples, found in a preamble to a rule amending the Direct Loan Program,75 provided a good illustration. The agency stated that the
following example (among others) “illustrate[s] the operation of the
final regulations”:
(to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 107); Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Digestive Disorders, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,398, 59,399–407 (Oct. 19, 2007) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
Under the heading of Section 107.50—Definitions, the SBA responded to a number of commenters that suggested changing the proposed definition of “Early Stage SBIC,” writing
“SBA . . . believes the commenters’ contrasting points of view illustrate the benefits of maintaining the flexibility that the proposed definition provided. SBA expects that some management
teams will focus exclusively on early stage companies, while others will opt for a mixed portfolio.” Small Business Investment Companies, supra, at 25,044–45. For another example, see Revised Medical Criteria, supra, at 59,399–407. The SSA also included a “Public Comments”
section that is a general response to comments. Id. at 59,407–20. Guidance appears throughout
these different formats. For instance, in the “Public Comments” section, one commenter suggested that all individuals who require feeding through intravenous or gastrostomy tubes should
be considered not able to work under the rule, but the SSA responded that “we do not think it
appropriate to presume disability in all individuals who need such treatment; we must evaluate
most situations on a case-by-case basis.” See id. at 59,409.
72 Removal of Listing of Impairments and Related Amendments, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,598,
63,598 (Dec. 4, 2009) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 220).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 63,599–600.
75 William H. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 3108, 3108 (Jan. 17, 2014)
(codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 685).
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Example 1: Borrower A and Borrower B are both enrolled
half-time and both enrolled in the fall term only. Borrower
A receives a Direct Subsidized Loan in the amount of the
annual loan limit and Borrower B receives a loan for less
than the annual loan limit.76
Following this introduction to the example, the DOE included a
chart and a few paragraphs explaining how the regulation would impact hypothetical borrowers.77
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) also
used detailed examples in a preamble to a rule establishing guidelines
for Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”).78 For instance, commenters expressed confusion over a proposed requirement that the
governing bodies of ACOs must be at least 75% controlled by Medicare-enrolled entities.79 CMS responded with an example: “[I]f a hospital, two physician groups, and a health plan formed an ACO, the
hospital and two physician groups must control at least 75 percent of
the ACO governing body.”80
As this short sampling suggests, agencies provide extensive guidance in the preambles to their final rules, whether through the articulation of the purposes and grounds for the rule, direct interpretive
commentary, or in detailed application examples,81 much of which
could have been provided in separately-issued guidance documents.
C. Explaining the Neglect of the Guidance Function
In light of the variety and extensive guidance agencies provide in
their preambles, and the grounding of this practice in history and current law, it is worth pausing to consider why the guidance function of
preambles has received so little attention. One plausible explanation
is that the guidance function may have lost priority in light of the increasing justificatory and analysis requirements saddled on preambles
and the subsequent concern by courts and commentators that agencies
76

Id. at 3114.

77

Id. at 3115.

Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
78

79

Id. at 67,819.

80

Id. at 67,820.

Christopher Walker’s recent study of agency rule drafters, see infra notes 126–128 and
accompanying text, provides further support that rule drafters view the preambles as sources
that courts—and presumably others—should rely upon. See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Regulatory Interpretation: A Research Note, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 61, 65–66 (2015).
81
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have turned to guidance documents as a less costly way of establishing
norms outside of notice-and-comment procedures.
The increased justificatory demands on agencies is a familiar
theme in the development of administrative law. Beginning in the late
1960s and early 1970s, courts transformed “arbitrary and capricious”
review under the APA into “hard look” review, requiring comprehensive justifications for agency rules to appear in their preambles.82 The
Supreme Court’s decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.83 still provides a classic statement and illustration of hard look review. In State Farm, the
Court set a high standard for the agency’s level of express justification
in its statement of basis and purpose in the preamble.84 To avoid being arbitrary or capricious under § 706 of the APA, the agency had to
“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation
for its action, including a ‘rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.’”85 State Farm explained that an agency rule
would be considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, or offered an explanation counter to the evidence before the agency or the rule could not
otherwise be viewed as the product of agency expertise.86
The Supreme Court used this standard in State Farm to reverse
the agency’s decision to rescind a rule, in part because the agency provided no consideration of one of the viable options within the ambit of
the existing rule.87 Since the State Farm decision, both the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals have emphasized that the vesting of
wide power in agencies “carries with it the correlative responsibility of
the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision”88—a duty that agencies discharge in their statements of basis
and purpose. This duty not only includes evaluation of alternatives
82 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive and
Critical Stories of Legal Development, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 276 (1990) (explaining how
judges elaborated the judicial review doctrines to align notice-and-comment rulemaking’s extraordinarily rigorous demands with agency reason-giving and rationalization); see Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1761–62
(2007) (describing development and persistence of hard look review); Note, Rationalizing Hard
Look Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1912–13 (2009).
83 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
84 Id. at 30–31.
85 Id. at 43.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 51.
88 Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986); see also, e.g., Detsel ex rel. Detsel
v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 1990).
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and explanation of the basis for the regulations adopted, but also a
duty to discuss salient comments.89 The agency’s articulation of the
grounds of its action and engagement with commentators in its statement of basis and purpose is necessary to the validity of the rule.
As these doctrines of judicial review congealed in the hard look
doctrine, the length of regulatory preambles has grown as measured
by the average number of pages per final rule published in the Federal
Register. A Congressional Research Service study reports that the average number of Federal Register pages per final rule including the
preamble in 1976, 1977, and 1978 was 1.70, 2.07, and 2.21 respectively,
whereas the averages in 2009, 2010, and 2011 were 5.93, 6.97, and 6.90
respectively.90 The conventional and common sense explanation for
the lengthening is that the prospect of stringent judicial review, which
requires the agency to “show its work,” has prompted agencies to
devote more energy to writing elaborate statements outlining the legal
sufficiency of their regulations in their preambles.91 Moreover, other
regulatory analysis requirements imposed on agencies add to the explanatory obligations agencies must discharge in their preambles, or in
the appendices, including the analysis requirements imposed by Executive Order 12,866,92 other executive orders,93 the Regulatory FlexibilSee, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1992).
See CAREY, supra note 15, at 17–18 (calculations produced by dividing the number of
pages per final rule, including preambles, by the number of final rules, as reported in Table 6).
91 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1401 (1992) (attributing the “Herculean effort of assembling the record
and drafting a preamble” to heightened judicial scrutiny of rulemaking); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995) (suggesting that
the stringent judicial gloss on the APA has “transformed the simple, efficient notice and comment process into an extraordinarily lengthy, complicated, and expensive process”); Mark
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review
of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 492–98 (1997) (providing account of
ways in which hard look review has increased burdens of explanation and evidence production
on agencies). Even if the standards of judicial review have not slowed down rulemaking, they
appear to have contributed to the lengthening of the agency’s explanatory materials in the
preamble.
92 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R 638, 642–43 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 126–29 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring agencies to submit detailed proposal with
summary of objectives, legal basis, relation of regulation to president’s priorities, etc., to executive branch for approval).
93 Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206, 210–11 (1999) (§ 8 requiring certification regarding compliance with federalism requirements of the order); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R.
304, 307 (2000) (§ 7 requiring certification regarding compliance with tribunal consultation requirements of the order); Exec. Order No. 13,045, 3 C.F.R. 198, 200–01 (1997) (§ 5 requiring
analysis and disclosure of risks to children as part of regulatory review); Exec. Order No. 13,211,
3 C.F.R. 767, 767–68 (2001) (§ 2 requiring consideration of actions with significant effects on
supply, distribution, or use of energy).
89
90
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ity Act,94 the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,95 the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,96 and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,97 among others. Under the weight of these justificatory and analysis requirements, the evaluative focus shifted to how an
agency’s preamble complied with these demands and away from the
preamble’s guidance role.
A common suspicion is that the very increased costs associated
with notice-and-comment rulemaking have given agencies incentives
to look for alternative, less costly ways to establish policy or advise the
public of the agency’s understanding of the law.98 In particular, as
noted at the outset, commentators and policymakers have worried
that the high cost of notice-and-comment rulemaking has caused
agencies to pivot toward guidance, relying on separately-issued guidance documents as opposed to re-engaging in a notice-and-comment
rulemaking,99 effectively substituting guidance documents for
rulemaking.100 The focus of debate over guidance has been in assessing whether agencies have been strategically substituting guidance
documents instead of engaging in rulemaking. Recent empirical investigations have undermined the view that agencies strategically substitute guidance for rules.101 But because preambles are not generally
94 5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2) (2012) (requiring agencies to state changes made in rule in response to comments).
95 44 U.S.C. § 3505 (2012) (requiring approval by Director of OMB that rules minimize
federal information collection burdens).
96 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012) (requiring preparation of environmental impact statement for
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment).
97 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(5)(A) (2012) (requiring agencies to respond to comments from state
and local governments).
98 See, e.g., supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. More generally, as Jacob Gersen and
Eric Posner observe, one of the general characteristics of soft law is that it is cheaper for the
institution than proceeding through the formalities required to issue binding law. See Gersen &
Posner, supra note 5, at 594–95.
99 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) (excepting interpretative rules and general statements of
policy from notice-and-comment requirements).
100 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311,
1316–17 (1992) (arguing that with the increased cost of notice-and-comment rulemaking, agencies are increasingly willing to rely on forms of nonlegislative rules, such as interpretative rules
and general statements of policy to implement their statutes); Pierce, supra note 91, at 86 (same);
see also supra notes 6–10.
101 See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1414, 1461 (2012) (finding no increase in Department of Interior’s issuance of guidance
between 1950–1990); Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 805–07 (2010) (finding that EPA, FDA, FCC, OSHA, and
IRS did not increase issuance of guidance strategically, though agencies did issue more guidance
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conceived as part of an agency’s guidance, this debate over guidance
did not address the extent to which the agencies rely upon their preambles as vehicles for guidance.
In sum, the increased legal demands applied to the agency’s preamble have been directed toward legal sufficiency or analysis requirements.102 To the extent those increased justificatory and analysis
requirements have had an effect on agency activities in rulemaking—
and the lengthening of agency preambles is a good indication of this
possible effect—they have augmented the prominence of the justificatory role of the preamble. At the same time, even as policymakers
and commentators have devoted more attention to agencies’ reliance
on guidance, that attention has been almost exclusively directed to
separately-issued guidance documents,103 not the extensive and varied
guidance provided in preambles. Despite agencies’ robust practices of
providing guidance in regulatory preambles, preamble guidance has
received little focused attention.
II. THE SUPERIORITY

OF

PREAMBLE GUIDANCE

Part I of this Article defended the guidance function of preambles both as a matter of design and agency practice. This Part argues
that preamble guidance is superior—in authority and political accountability—to other forms of guidance. This argument builds from
several commonplace observations about the difference between preambles and other forms of agency guidance.
First, as to source, the agency itself or the agency head issues preambles and thus their guidance content. The APA’s requirement that
as presidential terms waned); cf. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An
Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 936 (2008) (suggesting that volume of agency rulemaking shows it is not ossified). Interestingly, Anne Joseph
O’Connell’s study reveals that agencies have increased issuance of direct final rules and interim
final rules. See id. Both direct final rules and interim final rules include statements equivalent to
statements of basis and purpose, but they do not undergo a prepublication comment period. See
NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., supra note 12, 10–12 (noting that direct final rules and
interim final rules should include preambles explaining the rule’s purpose and grounds);
O’Connell, supra (noting that such forms of regulating bypass the ex ante procedural constraints
of traditional rulemaking). Agencies’ increased reliance on these forms suggests that at least the
“notice-and-comment rulemaking has significant costs that agencies want to avoid.” O’Connell,
supra.
102 See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 § 202, 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2012) (addressing regulatory procedures); Regulatory Flexibility Act § 3(a), 5 U.S.C. §§ 603–604 (2012)
(same); Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 § 244, 5 U.S.C. § 609
(2012); Congressional Review Act § 251, 5 U.S.C § 801 (2012) (same); Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 § 2, 44 U.S.C. § 3504(c) (2012) (same).
103 See, e.g., supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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rules issued through notice-and-comment be accompanied by a statement of their basis and purpose is a requirement that the same entity
that issues the rules also issues the statement of basis and purpose.104
The preamble to a regulation is one of the relatively few types of documents other than the regulations themselves that are issued by the
agency (or the agency subdelegate within the agency).105 Even for
regulatory commissions, where commissioners, on occasion, issue dissents from a regulation’s preamble,106 the preamble is still issued on
behalf of the agency, just as a majority opinion of a court in the
United States is issued on behalf of that court. While some guidance
documents are issued by the agency or under the signature of the
agency head, much guidance is issued by lower-level officials within
the agency.107 Indeed, it is precisely that fact which prompted the
drafters of the OMB’s Good Guidance Bulletin to require agencies to
develop policies for vetting their significant guidance.108 Thus, the
source of the preamble guidance alone renders it more authoritative
than all but the small set of guidance documents issued by the highest
authority in the agency.
Closely related, authorship by the agency also provides greater
assurance of internal vetting.109 For many agencies, notice-and-comment regulations contain the agency’s most important lawmaking and
policymaking. Even though many preambles are lengthy, the fact that
they are issued by the agency itself provides a strong proxy for internal deliberation and consideration within the highest echelons in the
agency. Guidance documents do not generally receive that same level
See STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, supra note 20, at 8–9.
See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that “subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer or agency is presumptively permissible absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congressional intent”).
106 See, e.g., Prohibitions on Market Manipulation, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,686, 40,703–04 (Aug. 12,
2009) (concurring statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch) (agreeing with issuing 16 C.F.R.
pt. 317 but expressing misgivings about the FTC’s rationale for the rule); Stack, Interpreting
Regulations, supra note 45, at 393–94 (discussing this example).
107 See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 367 (noting guidance issued at multiple levels in the
hierarchy).
108 See OMB’s Good Guidance Bulletin, supra note 1, at 3, 20. Not all agencies have yet
developed those written procedures. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-368,
REGULATORY GUIDANCE PROCESSES: SELECTED DEPARTMENTS COULD STRENGTHEN INTERNAL CONTROL AND DISSEMINATION PRACTICES 20 (2015) [hereinafter REGULATORY GUIDANCE
PROCESSES] (reporting that two of four agencies studied did not have written procedures or wide
knowledge of those procedures as required by the OMB’s Good Guidance Bulletin).
109 For a rich description of the internal review process for rules at the EPA, see Thomas O.
McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 89 (1991)
(describing working group, steering committee, and “Red Border Review” prior to submission
of draft rules and preambles to the Administrator).
104
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of review, nor is there the same level of institutional incentives for it.
The OMB’s Good Guidance Bulletin requires agencies to develop
written procedures for the approval of significant guidance to ensure
that it is approved by senior agency officials.110 That provides some
check that significant guidance documents—those leading to an annual effect on the economy of more than $100 million or as otherwise
defined by the OMB’s Good Guidance Bulletin—receive high-level
review within the agency.111 But only a small sliver of agency guidance qualifies as significant guidance such that it triggers this OMB
requirement for clearance by senior agency officials.112 For the rest,
there is no cross-cutting requirement of internal vetting (or a requirement that the guidance be issued by a rulemaking within the agency).
Moreover, this OMB requirement for clearing significant guidance
does not apply to independent agencies.113 Given the sheer volume of
most agencies’ guidance,114 it also would be unrealistic to presume that
guidance generally receives the same level of internal agency vetting
as preambles.
The preamble’s authorship by the highest-level officials within
the agency makes clear who is ultimately responsible for its contents,115 augmenting political accountability and accountability to the
stakeholder community for action. Moreover, for executive agencies,
as Professor Jennifer Nou emphasizes, draft regulatory preambles for
significant regulatory actions are also part of the rulemaking package
reviewed by OIRA.116 OIRA review not only involves the desk ofOMB’s Good Guidance Bulletin, supra note 1, at 20.
Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1853 (2013) (noting that administrations will not want important guidance documents to be issued without vetting by senior administrative officials).
112 See REGULATORY GUIDANCE PROCESSES, supra note 108, at 17 (departments studied
considered few of their guidance documents as “significant” under the OMB Bulletin and none
as “economically significant”).
113 OMB’s Good Guidance Bulletin, supra note 1, at 19.
114 See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 398–99 (noting that guidance documents far exceed
rules in number); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1468–69
(1992) (noting the same based on informal sampling).
115 See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT.
REV. 201, 238 (arguing that Chevron should be limited to actions taken by statutory delegates
whose actions are more politically accountable, disciplined, and easily identifiable than other
actors); Nou, supra note 23, at 112 n.145 (noting political accountability benefits of agency head
claiming authorship).
116 See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1755, 1779 (2013) (noting that regulatory submissions to OIRA include preambles and regulatory texts among other matters); Donald R. Arbuckle, OIRA and Presidential Regulatory Review: A View from Inside the Administrative State, EXPRESSO 39 n.98 (May 3, 2008) (unpublished
paper), http://works.bepress.com/donald_arbuckle/1/ (noting that draft preambles, regulatory
110
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ficers at OIRA but also officers within the Executive Office of the
President, and, depending on the subject matter, the views of other
departments and agencies,117 thus providing a formal check of vetting
by various executive branch officials. In these internal consultations
and conversations, the draft final preamble and the draft regulatory
text are both the subject of review;118 review comments may be directed towards the alternatives the agencies considered or should have
considered, issues typically disclosed in the preamble, not the text of
the draft rule.119 The dialogue between the agency and OIRA can
involve detailed negotiations about not only the text of the proposed
rule but also the text of the preamble.120 While a small selection of
significant freestanding guidance documents may obtain the same
level of executive review as preambles to significant regulations,121
that review is institutionalized and routine only for regulatory preambles.122 As rulemaking documents are typically more important for
policy and the public than stand-alone guidance documents, the level
of internal review within the agency and external review by OIRA is
more intensive.123 In short, regulatory preambles are typically the
products of more extensive political, expert, and intra-agency vetting
than other guidance documents.124
text, regulatory impact analysis as well as other materials are part of the agency submission to
OIRA).
117 See Sunstein, supra note 111, at 1854–56 (describing OIRA’s role as facilitator of interagency dialogue as part of review).
118 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN
REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 73 (2003)
[hereinafter OMB’S ROLE] (noting rules “in which the most significant changes attributed to
OIRA’s or OMB’s suggestions resulted in the addition or deletion of material in the explanatory
preamble section of the rule”).
119 See Sunstein, supra note 111, at 1857 (noting interagency debate about the alternatives
considered as an example of OIRA facilitated review).
120 OMB’S ROLE, supra note 118, at 111 (“Our review indicated that some changes made to
the preambles of the agencies’ rules (e.g., suggestions that agencies solicit comments on particular issues) could affect their application, and therefore appeared to us to be ‘substantive.’ ”); see
also id. at 10 (noting that in thirty-four of the sixty rules that OIRA did not significantly change,
“the changes that OIRA suggested primarily involved revisions to the language in the preambles
of the draft rules (e.g., expanding or clarifying agencies explanations of certain issues) or suggestions that the agencies request public comments on particular issues.”). For a collection of
changes to regulatory preambles in OIRA review, see id. app. II, at 132–87 (providing detailed
account of numerous changes to preambles).
121 See Orszag Memorandum, supra note 10 (noting that OMB reviews significant guidance
documents).
122 OMB’S ROLE, supra note 118, at 9.
123 See STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, supra note 20, at 30–31, 46–47.
124 Moreover, as Jennifer Nou points out, the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) imposes
report-and-wait requirements on both executive and independent agencies that require submis-
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Just as important, under long-established principles of administrative law, as noted above,125 preambles are an agency’s primary
venue to justify their rules. No stand-alone guidance document plays
that role. This doctrine further heightens an agency’s incentives to
devote significant resources to carefully vetting every aspect of its preamble in order to ensure the preamble can withstand legal challenge
to its accompanying rules. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine agencies
having any stronger incentives for careful deliberation given that the
validity of their most important lawmaking depends upon the preamble’s content. Nor is there any reason to think that same consideration does not extend to the guidance content of the preambles. How a
regulation applies is critical to judging both its permissibility under
statute as well as its rationality. Indeed, recent empirical research
provides some support for the claim that agencies conceive of regulatory preambles as their most deliberate discussion of the rule.126 In
Professor Christopher Walker’s recent study of federal rule drafters,
he asked the drafters whether courts should use a rule’s statements of
basis and purpose when interpreting their rules.127 All but one of his
respondents said they should.128 Professor Walker’s purpose was not
to compare statements of basis and purpose to other guidance documents, but the overwhelming consensus that courts should use preambles when interpreting the corresponding rules provides support for
the idea that agency actors regard these statements as reflecting the
agencies’ deliberate articulation of their positions.
Finally, regulatory preambles are published in the Federal Register, the most highly visible, accessible, and searchable compilation of
federal regulatory actions. All told, even if a small portion of separately-issued guidance documents do receive substantial vetting by the
sion of every “major” rule to each house of Congress as well as the Government Accountability
Office. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012); Nou, supra note 23, at 114. This means that the
draft text of major rules and their preambles are presented to Congress so that it has a chance to
pass a joint resolution of disapproval. Freestanding guidance documents do not have a similar
requirement of congressional reporting. At least in principle, this provides an additional assurance of the political accountability of regulatory preambles, though in practice Congress has
rarely passed a joint resolution of disapproval. See Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional
Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2169 (2009) (noting that under the CRA Congress only
repealed one major rule between 1996 and 2008).
125 See supra text accompanying notes 39–46.
126 Walker, supra note 81, at 66.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 64–66. Additionally, 29% agreed strongly that “agencies should draft the statement of basis and purpose . . . in part to guide courts,” 40% agreed, and 24% somewhat agreed.
Id. at 64. More of the results of the study are reported in Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency
Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999 (2015).
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agency and by central executive branch actors, that review is the norm
and is institutionalized only for regulatory preambles. Moreover, regulatory preambles have a legal feature that even significant freestanding guidance documents issued at the same time as rules do not
have—they provide the authoritative justification for the rules they
introduce.129 As a result, not only do they typically receive more extensive internal and external vetting, they also have an authoritative
legal status that separately-issued guidance does not. This superiority
has implications for judicial review and agency practice.
III. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

TO

PREAMBLE GUIDANCE

This Part argues that the guidance agencies provide in preambles
to final rules warrants greater judicial deference than other forms of
guidance. It first provides an account of the standard of judicial review for agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations. This complex area of law is founded on a basic principle that an agency’s most
considered and deliberate interpretations are the strongest candidates
for controlling deference or substantial weight. That principle provides the major premise for the argument that preamble guidance
warrants greater deference than other forms of guidance. The arguments of Part II as to the superiority of preamble guidance provide
the minor premise—that preambles best represent the agency’s considered and deliberate views of the regulation. The conclusion that
preamble guidance warrants greater deference follows from these two
premises.
A. The Court’s Standard of Deference for Guidance
In the Supreme Court’s increasingly reticulated doctrines regarding the standard of review of agency action, an underlying principle is
emerging (or reemerging): the agency is entitled to deference only for
interpretations—whether pertaining to statutes the agency administers or its own regulations—which (1) reflect the agency’s own views,
not those of lower-level officers, and (2) represent the agency’s most
considered position, not positions taken strategically or without deliberate vetting within the agency. This amounts to a reassertion of a
version of the “pay me now or pay me later”130 principle in adminisSTACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, supra note 20, at 7–9.
This principle has primarily been invoked with regard to the agency’s choice to issue
legislative rules or to proceed without them. See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41
DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491 (1992) (invoking this principle regarding the agency’s choice to proceed
through rulemaking to avoid burdens of case-by-case justification in enforcement); Matthew C.
129
130
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trative law: the agency must pay with careful deliberation and vetting
to qualify for deference, and without that, the agency must pay later
with greater judicial scrutiny of its actions. Under this principle, the
deliberate and publically justified actions of the statutory delegate
would presumptively qualify for greater deference.
First, consider the Supreme Court’s treatment of guidance that
interprets statutory terms. Under the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision
in United States v. Mead,131 guidance documents taking positions on
statutory issues generally do not warrant the controlling deference of
Chevron. Mead reserved Chevron deference for instances when the
agency both has been delegated authority to bind with the force of
law, and exercised that authority.132 The Court elaborated this requirement by noting that notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal
adjudication presumptively qualify for Chevron deference but still allowing for the possibility that less formal agency action may also qualify.133 The Mead Court offered as an example of this latter category a
decision in which the statutory delegate (the Comptroller) had interpreted a statute in the course of granting a bank a license to sell annuities.134 The Court has also, subsequently, granted deference to
guidance on statutory interpretation where the guidance was the
agency’s own position, reflecting the agency’s considered and consistent interpretation of an interstitial issue.135 Thus, with regard to guidance interpreting statutory terms, Mead created a safe harbor for the
agency’s most formal exercise of authority—rulemaking and formal
adjudication—but also granted Chevron deference to the agency’s
most considered expression of its views, such as a deliberate, formal
position taken by a statutory delegate.
Mead created an awkward disjuncture between deference granted
to agency statutory interpretations and the Court’s treatment of an
Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1464
(2011) (discussing this principle with regard to the choice to issue legislative rules). The formulation above is more general; under it, the agency may “pay me now” not only through legislative
rulemaking but also in other actions by the statutory delegate which indicate careful
deliberation.
131 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
132 Id. at 226–27.
133 Id. at 230–31.
134 Id. at 231 n.13 (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251, 256–57 (1995) (granting deference to position of Comptroller of Currency who is
charged with enforcement of banking laws)).
135 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219–20 (2002) (granting Chevron deference to
Social Security Administration’s own longstanding interpretation issued without notice-andcomment).
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agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. As noted above, under
the established standard for the latter type of review, identified with
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. and Auer v. Robbins,136 a court
must accept an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless
the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”137 Most agency interpretations of their own regulations appear in informal formats (for obvious reasons, agencies will not
generally engage in a notice-and-comment rulemaking to interpret a
prior regulation, when they could just reinterpret it informally). As a
result, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Mead, guidance documents can fall under two different deference regimes. Because guidance documents are, by definition, not exercises of lawmaking
authority, under the basic test in Mead, a guidance document construing an agency’s authorizing statute would presumptively not qualify
for controlling weight under Chevron deference. But if the document
interpreted the agency’s own regulation, it would be entitled the controlling deference of Seminole Rock/Auer. To address this inconsistency, commentators have advocated restricting the scope of Seminole
Rock/Auer’s application to bring it in line with Chevron by confining it
to more formal interpretations.138
While the Court has not directly embraced this critique, in recent
years, the Court has limited Seminole Rock/Auer’s application in ways
consistent with this criticism. In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp.,139 the Supreme Court made clear that, although Auer deference
was the general rule, it did not apply in all cases;140 and the Court
reiterated this limitation in its 2015 decision in Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Association.141 Thus far, the Court has identified three limitations on Auer’s application. First, by its own terms, Auer deference
does not apply when the agency’s interpretation “is plainly erroneous
136

See supra note 25.

Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 359 (1989) (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414)). Several justices have expressed an
interested in reconsidering the doctrine. See supra note 25.

R

137

Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 900
(2001) (“Seminole Rock deference should at a minimum be subject to the same limitations that
apply to the scope of Chevron deference.”); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 130, at 1484–86,
1496 (arguing that Mead’s logic for constraining Chevron’s scope of application extends to Seminole Rock).

R

138

139

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).

140

Id. at 2166.

Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 n.4 (2015) (noting that Auer deference is not an “inexorable command” and is not appropriate in some cases).
141
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or inconsistent with the regulation,”142 just as Chevron deference does
not apply when the statute clearly precludes the agency’s view. Second, and most relevant for our purposes, Auer deference does not apply when the agency’s interpretation “does not reflect the agency’s fair
and considered judgment on the matter in question.”143 As examples
of an agency’s position not reflecting its fair and considered view, the
Court mentioned interpretations that conflict with prior interpretations, and those that are merely a convenient litigating position or a
post hoc rationalization “advanced by an agency seeking to defend
past agency action against attack.”144 Third, the Court has previously
denied Auer’s application to agency interpretation of regulations
when those regulations substantially “parrot” the statutory language.145 The Court’s emphasis, that only agency interpretations of
their regulations that represent the agency’s “fair and considered
view” warrant deference under Auer, brings Auer’s application closer
in scope to Chevron’s application.
The underlying premise in these doctrines is that the agency’s entitlement to deference depends upon overt indications that the
agency’s interpretation—whether of its authorizing statute or its own
regulations—reflects the agency’s most considered, deliberate view.
Not only do rulemaking and formal adjudication satisfy this standard,
but also positions that the agency itself has taken146 that reflect a deliberate view, as evidenced by the position being long-held and wellreasoned, as opposed to strategic positions taken post hoc147 and positions that are not coordinated within the agency.148
In light of the critique of the Auer doctrine embraced by members of the Supreme Court,149 it is worth noting that the same considerations are relevant to the weight given to an agency’s interpretation
if it does not qualify for controlling deference under Chevron (for statutory interpretations) or under Auer (for regulatory interpretations).
When neither Chevron nor Auer is warranted, the Court defaults to
SmithKline, 132 S. Ct. at 2166 (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 359).
Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462).
144 Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462).
145 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (denying Auer deference on the ground
that the regulation interpreted merely parrots the statutory language).
146 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219 (2002); NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1995).
147 See SmithKline, 132 S. Ct. at 2166.
148 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001) (noting that agency rulings
issued at a rate of more than 10,000 a year by forty-six scattered offices do not have a lawmaking
pretense).
149 See supra note 25.
142
143
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the standard of review articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.150 In
Skidmore, the agency’s interpretation was not “controlling,”151 but
was still entitled to weight. In Justice Jackson’s memorable phrasing,
the weight of the agency’s position on matters within its area of expertise will vary depending on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”152 Thus the very factors that support the applicability of Chevron and Auer—the deliberate,
considered quality of the interpretation, and its embrace by the
agency itself—would also strengthen the weight given to the agency in
review under Skidmore. So under each of the Court’s deference doctrines, the agency’s most deliberate positions warrant greatest
deference.
B. Deference to Preamble Guidance
In light of this principle of deference, the argument that preamble
guidance merits greater deference than other guidance just needs a
minor premise: that preamble guidance reflects the kind of deliberate,
considered view that would entitle it to the greatest level of deference,
regardless of the specific doctrinal framework applied. The argument
for that premise is straightforward and has largely already been made
in discussing the superiority of preamble guidance. In short, preambles are authored by the agency itself, issued contemporaneously to
provide the exclusive justification of the regulations in the event they
are challenged, and as a result, generally receive the higher level of
vetting internally within the agency and by the executive branch than
any other guidance. The very ways in which the guidance in preambles makes it superior and distinct from other guidance are also reasons why, under the Supreme Court’s standard of deference, it should
be granted the greatest weight.
This deference could come in two forms. First, preamble guidance is a special case for Auer deference. The Supreme Court’s 2012
decision in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. provides a doc150 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). See SmithKline, 132 S. Ct. at 2168–69
(applying Skidmore to review an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation that did not qualify for review under Auer); Mead, 533 U.S. at 220 (agencies’ interpretations that do not qualify
for Chevron still merit some deference under Skidmore given the “specialized experience and
broader investigations and information available to the agency”); Manning, supra note 7, at
686–90 (arguing for adoption of the Skidmore standard).
151 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
152 Id.
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trinal foothold for treating agency’s statements in regulatory preambles differently than other (and, in particular, post hoc) guidance. In
SmithKline, the Court declined to accord Seminole Rock/Auer deference to a Department of Labor (“DOL”) interpretation of its own
regulations that contradicted earlier DOL positions and was in tension
with statements in the regulation’s preamble.153 The specific question
before the Court was whether pharmaceutical sales representatives
qualified as “outside salesmen,” under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”).154 For many years, the DOL had considered pharmaceutical sales representatives to be “outside salesmen” under the regulations.155 Those regulations defined the statutory term “outside
salesman” as “any employee . . . [w]hose primary duty is . . . making
sales within the meaning of” the FLSA.156 In the preamble to the regulations, the DOL had stressed its interpretation that the “outside
salesman” exception applies whenever an employee “in some sense
make[s] a sale,”157 and “‘should not depend’ on technicalities, such as
‘whether . . . the sales employee . . . types the order into a computer
system and hits the return button.’”158
But before the litigation at issue in SmithKline, the DOL had
changed course; in a sequence of amicus briefs in pending cases that
preceded the litigation at issue in SmithKline, it took the position that
pharmaceutical sales representatives were not outside salesmen.159
On fair notice grounds, the Court rejected the argument that it must
defer to the DOL’s new position: “To defer to the agency’s interpretation in this circumstance would seriously undermine the principle that
agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct
[a regulation] prohibits or requires.’”160 The Court went on to note
that to defer in this case would “result in precisely the kind of ‘unfair
surprise’ against which our cases have long warned.”161 Indeed, in explaining how deference here would create unfair surprise, the Court
153 SmithKline, 132 S. Ct. at 2165–68; see also Halo v. Yale Health Plan, 819 F.3d 42, 52 (2d
Cir. 2016) (interpreting a regulation in light of its purposes, as stated in the regulation’s
preamble).
154 SmithKline, 132 S. Ct. at 2161.
155 Id. at 2163, 2167–68.
156 Id. at 2162 (alterations in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(1)(i) (2004)).
157 Id. at 2163 (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,162 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 541)).
158 Id. (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,163).
159 Id. at 2165.
160 Id. at 2167 (alteration in original) (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
161 Id. (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007)).
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wrote that the “statute and regulations certainly do not provide clear
notice” of the possibility of a changed interpretation with regard to
pharmaceutical representatives qualifying as outside salesmen.162 To
explain the point, the Court noted that “nothing in the statutory or
regulatory text or the DOL’s prior guidance plainly requires a contrary reading”163—and the Court pointedly cited the regulation’s preamble as an example of that prior guidance.164 Moreover, the Court’s
other reasoning further suggests that it viewed the distinction between
guidance provided ex ante and that provided post hoc as meaningful:
It is one thing to expect regulated parties to conform their
conduct to an agency’s interpretations once the agency announces them; it is quite another to require regulated parties
to divine the agency’s interpretations in advance or else be
held liable when the agency announces its interpretations for
the first time in an enforcement proceeding and demands
deference.165
SmithKline could be read narrowly as denying deference only
when the agency’s position is post hoc, is announced in a brief in the
context of an enforcement proceeding, and changes a longstanding interpretation. But the Court’s underlying rationale for denying deference was broader and provides some support for granting preambles
greater deference than other forms of guidance. The Court fundamentally objected to the DOL’s departure from the interpretation in
the preamble long-held by the DOL.166 This suggests that preambles
fall on the deliberate and considered side of the line, such that, under
Auer, they should be given controlling weight unless they contradict
the regulation or statutes. When viewed through the lens of Auer,
preamble guidance has the strongest claim to controlling deference.167
But even if, for one reason or another, Auer deference were not
available, preamble guidance should receive greater weight under
Id.
Id.
164 Id. (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,162 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 541)) (“See Preamble 22162 (explaining that an employee must ‘in some sense’ make a
sale). . . .”).
165 Id. at 2168.
166 Id. (noting that, for decades, the DOL “never initiated any enforcement actions” on this
topic).
167 This position is the corollary of the point that regulations should be interpreted in light
of their preambles. Treating the preamble as a privileged source for interpretation of regulations
could also be viewed as giving the preamble a form of controlling deference. Whether framed as
a privileged source for interpretation or as meriting special judicial deference, the conclusion is
the same: the preamble has a special claim on how the regulation is read.
162
163
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Skidmore review. As a class, preambles provide the agency’s most
detailed explanation and reasoning in the exercise of its expertise and
political judgment. So the very reasons that preambles are the strongest candidates for Auer deference justify granting them the greatest
weight in Skidmore review. Either way, as the agency’s most carefully
considered and vetted statements, preamble guidance is entitled to
greater deference or weight than other forms of guidance.
C. Objections
It is worth addressing three objections. One objection is that
greater deference to guidance in preambles could be seen as giving
agencies incentives to load their preambles with guidance content in
order to obtain heightened deference to that content. There are several lines of response. At a basic level, it is not clear why the provision of more guidance earlier (such as in the preamble) is a problem
so long as agencies do not include legislative rules in their preambles,
which they are not permitted to do.168 Indeed, more guidance provided earlier in the regulatory process is generally a benefit. Further,
a significant constraint on including guidance in a preamble is that
such guidance provides a constraint on later-issued guidance.169 By
virtue of the operation of arbitrariness review and its requirements of
reasoned decisionmaking, agency guidance that contradicts the guidance in a preamble needs justification.170 SmithKline stands clearly
for that point.171 If preamble guidance reduces the agency’s later flexibility to change position, there is a built-in incentive for the agency, at
least within the same presidential administration, not to overload preambles with guidance. Moreover, if agencies heed the arguments below the special constraint on revising preamble guidance,172 the
constraint will be still greater.
A second line of objection raises the practical issue of whether
guidance provided in a preamble is as easy for the public and the regulated to access and read as topical guidance documents. Why give
greater deference and authority to guidance that can be more costly to
locate and difficult to understand? As many preambles are currently
168 See STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, supra note 20, at 23 (discussing
this prohibition).
169 See infra Part IV.
170 See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 935–36 (2004)
(arguing that an agency would not have less obligation to justify its departure from a nonlegislative rule than its departure from an agency precedent).
171 See supra notes 153–166 and accompanying text.
172 See infra Part IV.
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organized and presented, locating their guidance content is often not
as easy as locating topically organized guidance documents. In addition, as a recent study illustrates, preambles are frequently written at a
high reading level.173 The most basic response is that even if agencies
have room for improvement in making their preamble guidance as
accessible as their other guidance documents, this objection does not
undermine the underlying reasons for granting greater deference to
guidance in preambles. The grounds for deference have to do with
the authority of preamble guidance, not merely its accessibility.
Moreover, recent reforms hold promise for improving the accessibility of preambles. A 2014 Recommendation of the Administrative
Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) addresses how agencies
draft preambles, including urging use of section-by-section analysis
and resisting incorporation or reliance upon discussions in prior notices.174 In addition, that Recommendation advised agencies to integrate their preambles into their compilations of guidance and into
accessible sources presenting their guidance.175 The pragmatic task of
integrating the presentation of preamble guidance may prompt more
substantive deliberation within the agencies about the levels of authority of their guidance and varieties of their guidance and internal
law.176 Responding to these ACUS Recommendations, as well as suggestions by advocates for improved readability of rulemaking documents,177 would augment the guidance function of preambles.
A third line of objection to granting greater deference to guidance in preambles raises a deeper issue. Professor Nina Mendelson
exposes a systemic problem with the issuance of stand-alone guidance
documents: indirect regulatory beneficiaries have far fewer ways of
holding the agency accountable for positions taken in freestanding
guidance documents—whether through participation or access to judicial review—than they have for notice-and-comment regulations.178
173 See Cynthia R. Farina et al., The Problem with Words: Plain Language and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1358, 1395–96 (2015) (finding that executive
summaries exceed college reading levels for all agencies studied). This study also provides a
careful account of the efforts to improve the accessibility and readability of rulemaking documents. See id. at 1367–79.
174 Administrative Conference Recommendation 2014–3, Guidance in the Rulemaking
Process, 79 Fed. Reg. 35,988, 35,992–93 (June 25, 2014) (recommendations 2 & 3).
175 Id. (recommendation 5).
176 STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, supra note 20, at 51 (arguing that
integrating preamble guidance into other guidance may help overcome perceptions that preambles pertain only to legal sufficiency).
177 See Farina et al., supra note 173, at 1362.
178 See Mendelson, supra note 1, at 420–33.
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So why grant (heightened) deference to statements in preambles?
While not a complete response to the concerns Professor Mendelson
raises, it is worth emphasizing some of the advantages guidance in
preambles has over separately-issued guidance with regard to accountability. Preamble guidance is endorsed by the head(s) of the
agency or commission, so there is a political accountability check that
many other guidance documents do not have. In addition, while there
is not a separate process right to comment on the content of a preamble, courts look with disfavor on statements in agency preambles that
were not ventilated by the agency in its prior notice of proposed
rulemaking. For instance, in Wyeth v. Levine,179 the Supreme Court
declined to accord the FDA’s position on preemption stated in its final
preamble any weight in part because its notice of proposed rulemaking disclaimed preemption in the regulations, and neither the public
nor the states were offered any opportunity to comment on the new
position taken in the final preamble.180 Thus, even though regulatory
beneficiaries still face greater obstacles than regulated entities in obtaining judicial review of guidance, as Professor Mendelson argues,181
guidance in preambles still has accountability advantages over many
other guidance documents. Those accountability advantages, as well
as the integral role of preambles in the rulemaking process, ground
the argument for granting greater deference to preamble guidance
than other forms of guidance.
While agencies could do more to make their preamble guidance
as accessible as their other guidance, preambles remain an agency’s
most deliberate and well-considered expressions of its view of its own
regulations. This creates opportunities for greater judicial deference—opportunities to which many agencies are attuned but some
may squander. One of the respondents in Professor Walker’s study
commented, “I think agencies routinely blow this opportunity.”182
This Article’s argument that preambles are entitled to greater deference highlights the cost to agencies for missing this opportunity.

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
Id. at 575–77.
181 Mendelson, supra note 1, at 422, 425.
182 The comment was made in response to Professor Walker’s survey asking about whether
agencies should draft preambles to guide courts in their interpretation of regulations. See
Walker, supra note 81, at 66.
179
180
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AGENCY PRACTICE

The superiority of preamble guidance is a double-edged sword
for agencies. While preambles merit greater judicial deference, their
superiority also imposes constraints. In particular, this Part argues
that preambles not only supersede previously-issued inconsistent guidance, but also impose special obligations when the agency seeks to
revise or amend its preamble guidance—or is required to do so by a
court order.
The argument above that preamble guidance is superior to other
forms of guidance implies that preamble guidance should generally be
treated as superseding and displacing prior inconsistent guidance. Indeed, given that preamble guidance pertains to the meaning of regulations being issued, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance where prior
guidance would be more authoritative than that contained in a preamble. Perhaps if the preamble to a regulation included a gloss on a
different previously-issued regulation, the priority of the later-issued
preamble guidance would be less clear. But in the main, the preamble’s status as part of the new moment of lawmaking gives it greater
authority than previous guidance.
The more important and difficult question is the constraint preamble guidance imposes on an agency’s later action. In particular,
how may an agency revise its preamble guidance? A host of considerations bear on this issue, some substantive and some procedural. On
the substantive side, an agency may not, in later guidance documents,
contradict the conclusions or interpretations of the preamble that
were necessary to the validity of the rule. Put another way, an agency
is obliged not to sever or revise matters in the preamble that are necessary to the reasoned justification of the rule;183 to do so would
render the rule arbitrary and capricious. But within that substantive
limit, the superiority of preamble guidance also recommends some
procedural requirements for revision. For instance, given the superiority of preamble guidance, it does not make sense to allow a lowerlevel official within the agency to revise positions taken in the preamble. The following process requirements strike a good balance between agency flexibility and the superiority of preamble guidance:
when an agency seeks to revise interpretations given in its preamble,
183 Cf. Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 124 YALE
L.J. 2286, 2341 (2015) (noting that if severing a portion of a rule would render the rule arbitrary
and capricious a court should remand to the agency). This raises the question of how a court
should approach an administrative severability clause that pertains to the rule’s preamble as well
as sections of the rule.
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or is forced to do so by a court ruling,184 (1) the author of the revision
must be the same (or higher) hierarchical level in the agency as the
author of the original preamble, (2) the revision must be published in
the Federal Register, and (3) must be expressly justified.
Each of these procedural requirements matters. First, given that
preambles are issued by the agency in its lawmaking capacity, requiring that the same author issue the revision provides an assurance of
internal consideration within the agency; we presume that documents
issued by the agency itself have been extensively vetted within the
agency. This authorship requirement ensures that those politically accountable within the agency have approved the revision and remain
responsible for it—and, just as important, that individual agency officials do not have the power to revise commitments made in a preamble. This would implement the principle that revision of preamble
guidance should match the deliberation and accountability of the preamble itself. Second, publication in the Federal Register makes the
announcement at the same level of publicity and accessibility as the
original preamble. And, finally, the requirement of justification is unavoidable; reasoned justification for a change in position is a basic requirement for surviving arbitrariness review.185
These obligations can be usefully understood as akin to those for
departing from an adjudicative precedent. Professor Peter Strauss has
insightfully argued that published agency guidance should be thought
of as imposing the same level of constraint on agencies as agency precedent—namely, that the agency may act inconsistently with its published guidance documents only with special justification.186 Adapting
this idea of precedential reasoning, it matters whether the guidance is
issued by a line attorney or the agency itself, just as it matters whether
the decision is from a lower or higher court. Preamble guidance issues
from the highest level of authority within the agency, and so should
not be contradicted by lower-level officials, just as lower-level courts
cannot contravene their superiors. Precedent also captures the reSee Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43,
46–51 (1983) (requiring reasoned justification for change of position); Manning, supra note 170,
at 935 n.208 (making this point); cf. Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative
Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 135–59 (2011) (developing a theory of justification requirements
under arbitrariness review); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 1823, 1863, 1877–79 (2015) (examining constraints longstanding interpretations impose on agencies and defending agency flexibility so long as agencies provide fair warning such as through a notice-and-comment process).
186 See Strauss, supra note 5, at 823–24; see also Manning, supra note 170, at 934–35 (arguing nonlegislative rules enjoy precedential force).
184
185
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quirement of justification. An agency action that deviates from guidance in a regulatory preamble requires a reasoned justification, just
as departure from a precedent does for a court.187
But a critical difference is that the requirements that a preamble
be revised only from a body positioned at the same level or higher in
the agency hierarchy (a “hierarchy” requirement) and published in
the Federal Register are not judicially enforceable. To see this, first
consider a more stringent procedural requirement that revisions to a
preamble be made only through a notice-and-comment proceeding.
That requirement would be clearly invalid under Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Association.188 At issue in Perez was a D.C. Circuit doctrine—most often associated with Alaska Professional Hunters v.
FAA189 and Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena, L.P.190—
that an agency must proceed through notice-and-comment rulemaking
to issue a new interpretation of a regulation that deviates materially
from a prior interpretation.191 The Perez Court roundly rejected this
doctrine on the ground that it imposes a procedural obligation beyond
those specified in the APA.192 Thus, Perez would also foreclose judicial enforcement of the requirement that only certain entities in the
agency revise preamble guidance or publish those revisions in a particular way. As the Court reiterated in Perez, “the APA ‘sets forth the
full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for
procedural correctness.’”193 The APA imposes no requirement regarding who may revise an agency’s guidance or preambles or where
such a revision is to be published. Accordingly, a court could not demand agencies to comply with these requirements under the APA.
The bar on judicial enforcement does not, however, prevent
agencies from adopting these requirements as a matter of their own
internal law or central executive branch actors from imposing this obligation on agencies. If adopted in executive branch policy, these requirements would amount to a generalization of the obligations
currently imposed by the OMB’s Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices. The Bulletin states that “[a]gency employees should
See Manning, supra note 170, at 934–35; Strauss, supra note 5, at 824–25.
See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1205–06 (2015).
189 Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999), abrogated by Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199.
190 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), abrogated
by Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199.
191 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1205.
192 Id. at 1206.
193 Id. at 1207 (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009)).
187
188
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not depart from significant guidance documents without appropriate
justification and supervisory concurrence.”194 The requirement for revision urged here is one step more demanding; it would demand that
revisions of preamble guidance be issued at the same or greater level
within the agency hierarchy as the original preamble, accompanied by
a justification published in the Federal Register. But given the superior status of preamble guidance, these demands are justified. That
reform could be adopted in a revision to the Good Guidance Bulletin
or by individual agencies as part of their policy on guidance.
The Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) response to the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Michigan v. EPA195 provides a
nice example of an agency’s revision of its preamble in accordance
with these principles. In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court invalidated an interpretation of the Clean Air Act that the EPA had taken
in the preamble to a related regulation.196 In 2000, the EPA, after a
study, had concluded that regulation of coal- and oil-fired power
plants was “appropriate and necessary” under the Clean Air Act, and
the agency reaffirmed that conclusion in 2012.197 In making this determination, the EPA interpreted the term “appropriate” to not require
consideration of costs as to the initial decision of whether to regulate.198 As the Court noted, in the preamble to the regulation, the
agency specified, “[w]e further interpret the term ‘appropriate’ to not
allow for the consideration of costs.”199 The Court rejected this position, interpreting the phrase “appropriate and necessary” as requiring
consideration of costs.200 Effectively the Court’s Michigan v. EPA decision reversed a position that the EPA took in a regulation’s preamble. After Michigan v. EPA, the EPA was clearly presented with the
question of how it could revise an interpretive position taken in its
preamble.
The EPA responded to the Court’s ruling by issuing for public
comment a consideration of costs for the initial decision to regulate
coal- and oil-fired electric utility generating units.201 This was pubOMB’s Good Guidance Bulletin, supra note 1, at 20.
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
196 Id. at 2705–07 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9363 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 60 & 63)).
197 Id. at 2705.
198 Id. at 2706.
199 Id. (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976, 24,988 (May 3, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
60 & 63)); see also id. (quoting 77 Fed. Reg. at 9327) (“Cost does not have to be read into the
definition of ‘appropriate.’ ”).
200 Id. at 2707–10, 2712.
201 See Supplemental Finding that It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous
194
195
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lished in the Federal Register, under the signature of the Administrator of the EPA.202 In this proposed supplemental finding, the EPA
concluded that consideration of costs did not alter its previous decision that regulation was appropriate.203 The EPA’s action following
Michigan v. EPA met (indeed, exceeded) the executive branch requirements for preamble revisions defended above: the agency formally revised the preamble in a statement by an official at the same or
higher level in the agency as the initial author of the rule and preamble, and in addition (beyond the requirement suggested above), it offered the public an opportunity to comment on those revisions
through a notice in the Federal Register. While Perez would prohibit a
court from requiring these elements, they represent best agency practices for revision of a preamble.
CONCLUSION
The internal law of the administrative state—what much administrative law might characterize as guidance or soft law—plays a critical
role in the systemic legality of regulatory governance.204 But to understand these internal legal constraints requires evaluating different
forms of internal law and their distinctive features. This Article attends to a species of document that justifies a vast swath of federal
law—the preambles to final rules. It shows that these documents were
designed to have a guidance function as well as to serve a justificatory
role—and agencies continue to include significant guidance in their
preambles. As this Article argues, the guidance agencies include in
their preambles is superior in authority to other forms of agency guidance because preambles are issued by the agency in its rulemaking as
part of the agency’s authoritative justification for a rule, and they accordingly obtain the highest level of vetting and careful consideration
by agency and executive officials. Under current standards of judicial
review, the superiority of preamble guidance has an important implication: that preamble guidance is a special case for judicial deference
regardless of whether the Auer or Skidmore standards apply. Accordingly, preambles provide agencies with their best opportunity for judiAir Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.
75,025, 75,025 (Dec. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
202 Id. at 75,042.
203 Id. at 75,026.
204 See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 223 (2012) (“A robust internal law
of administration is always necessary to systemic legality and is often the most constant protector
of private rights.”).
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cial deference to their interpretive view of a rule’s meaning and
application. But the very superiority of preamble guidance also has a
constraining implication for agencies. An element of the internal law
of agency action is that preamble guidance should only be revised if
done so with a level of deliberation, political accountability, and accessibility that mirrors that of the underlying preamble. That policy
on revision or departure from preamble guidance could be adopted by
OIRA or by individual agencies.

